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Abstract. Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been
proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak
information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be prob-
lematic. For example, if all the votes go to one candidate then all vote
privacy evaporates. The mere possibility of candidates getting no or few
votes could have implications for security in practice: if a coercer de-
mands that a voter cast a vote for such an unpopular candidate, then
the voter may feel obliged to obey, even if she is confident that the vot-
ing system satisfies the standard coercion resistance definitions. With
complex ballots, there may also be a danger of “Italian” style (aka “sig-
nature”) attacks: the coercer demands the voter cast a ballot with a
specific, identifying pattern.
Here we propose an approach to tallying end-to-end verifiable schemes
that avoids revealing all the votes but still achieves whatever confidence
level in the announced result is desired. Now a coerced voter can claim
that the required vote must be amongst those that remained shrouded.
Our approach is based on the well-established notion of Risk-Limiting
Audits, but here applied to the tally rather than to the audit. We show
that this approach counters coercion threats arising in extreme tallies
and “Italian” attacks. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the
Selene scheme, and we extend the approach to Risk-Limiting Verification,
where not all vote trackers are revealed, thereby enhancing the coercion
mitigation properties of Selene.
Keywords: End-to-end verifiability, risk-limiting audits, plausible de-
niability, coercion resistance.
1 Introduction
Many verifiable voting schemes have been proposed that are designed to give a
high level of resistance against coercion or vote buying [4,12,8,20,22]. However,
it is typically assumed that little can be done about coercion threats in case
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of extreme outcomes, e.g., no or few votes for some candidates. Unfortunately,
such situations do happen in real elections. If there is a (perceived) risk that
candidate X will get no votes, and the coercer tells the voter to vote for X ,
then the voter may feel obliged to comply even if the voting scheme satisfies the
standard definitions of coercion resistance. The possibility is more dangerous
than it seems at the first glance. True, coercing for the low support candidate X
is unlikely to get him or her win. However, the coercer can use X to construct
what is effectively an abstention attack, and take away the votes from the main
opponent of his preferred candidate. If the coercer prefers candidate A, he can
help him win by coercing supporters of B to vote for X .
Another difficulty that may arise is that of so-called “Italian”-style attacks,
also known as “signature” attacks: if the voting method allows for a large number
of distinct ways of filling out the ballot, a coercer may require the voter to fill
out the ballot with a distinctive pattern allowing it to be uniquely identified
with high probability in the final tally. This is especially an issue with long,
complex ballots and with preferential voting schemes. It can be countered by, for
example, using homomorphic tallying techniques to compute the overall result
without revealing the individual ballots, but this is computationally intensive
and even then may leak some critical information [27].
Here, we show that risk-limiting audit techniques [16] can be adapted to
achieve whatever level of confidence in the outcome is required while ensuring
that a proportion of the ballots remain shrouded. This allows us to significantly
enhance the coercion resistance of verifiable schemes. The Risk Limiting Tally
(RLT) approach that we present here provides a simple way to guarantee voters
plausible deniability against the above attacks: a coerced voter, who did not cast
the ballot the way the coercer had demanded, can simply claim that the required
ballot is amongst those unrevealed.
We also present a variant of the idea, Risk Limiting Verification (RLV),
where we ensure that a proportion of verification tokens remain unrevealed. The
basic version of the Selene scheme [20] has the drawback that the the coercer
can claim that the fake tracker provided by a voter is his own. We describe how
RLV mitigates this.
A possible objection to RLT is that it is “undemocractic” not to count all
votes. However, the method allows the electoral outcome (i.e. the winner or
winners) to be ascertained to any desired level of statistical certainty. Moreover,
the sample of ballots will be drawn in such a way that every cast vote has an
equal chance of being in the revealed sample, so there is no lack of fairness. RLTs
are related to random sample voting (RSV), due to Chaum [7], except that there
the sample is drawn from the set of eligible voters, rather than from the cast
votes. If anything, RLTs seem to be more democratic in that in RSV voters
who are not chosen might well feel excluded. Furthermore, in RLTs we are able
to adjust the sample size after voting to achieve the desired confidence level.
We note also that some tally algorithms, e.g. some forms of STV, intrinsically
involve a probabilistic element.
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The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss coercion-
resistant and verifiable voting schemes in general, and Selene in particular. Sec-
tion 3 briefly recalls Risk-Limiting Audits, and Section 4 introduces the tech-
niques for RLTs. We present the actual protocol in Section 5, and a brief security
discussion in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the risk-limiting verification. Related
work is presented in Section 8, and we conclude in Section 9.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper we present several contributions:
1. The use of using risk-limiting techniques to shroud a proportion of votes,
improving coercion resistance while achieving whatever confidence level is
required.
2. A novel extension of Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) techniques to handle the
situation in which we do not have an initial null hypothesis (reported out-
come).
3. A new test statistic for RLAs with operating characteristics that do not
depend on the reported votes, only on the reported winner(s).
4. Protocols to enable RLT for most end-to-end verifiable schemes, including
strategies to ensure plausible deniability whatever the vote distribution is.
5. Extension of the approach to Risk-Limiting Verification: the shrouding of
a randomly selected subset of verification tokens to improve coercion resis-
tance, in particular for the Selene scheme.
2 Coercion-Resistant and Verifiable Voting
We set the scene by recalling the concepts of End-to-End Verifiability [21] and
coercion-resistance [4,12], and showing an example scheme designed to balance
the two requirements.
2.1 An Outline of End-to-End Verifiable Voting
The use of digital technologies to record and process votes might provide effi-
ciency and convenience, but it can also bring serious new threats, in particular,
virtually undetectable ways to manipulate votes on a large scale. These concerns
motivated the development of End-to-End Verifiable (E2E V) voting schemes.
Such schemes provide the voters with means to confirm that their vote is ac-
curately included in the tally, without opening up possibilities of coercion or
vote-buying. This is usually accomplished by creating an encryption of the vote
at the time of casting, and posting this to a public Bulletin Board (BB). Voters
can then confirm that their “receipt,” i.e., the encrypted vote, appears correctly
on the BB.
Once we have consensus on the correct set of encrypted votes, these can be
processed in a verifiable fashion to calculate the outcome in a way that does not
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compromise the privacy of the votes. For instance, the encrypted votes might
be put through a sequence of verifiable re-encryption mixes and then verifiably
decrypted, allowing anyone to compute the result. Alternatively, the encrypted
votes might be tallied under encryption, exploiting the homomorphic properties
of the encryption algorithm, and the final result decrypted. To complete the
assurance argument we need some additional ingredients:
– The voter needs to be confident that her intended vote is correctly encrypted
in her receipt.
– We need to prevent ballot stuffing, i.e., we need to ensure that only legiti-
mately cast votes appear in the list of receipts on the BB, and only one per
voter.
– We need to know that “enough” voters check that their intended votes are
correctly encrypted, and that their encrypted votes appear on BB.
– We need dispute-resolution mechanisms in place to ensure that if voters
detect (or claim to detect) problems, the culprit can be identified and ap-
propriate action taken.
Typically the first point is addressed by some form of cut-and-chose protocol,
e.g. Benaloh Challenge [5], or a more sophisticated approach such as Neff’s
MarkPledge scheme [2]. Ballot stuffing is usually countered either by procedural
measures in the polling station, or by requiring that receipts be digitally signed
by the voters. The former does not provide universal eligibility verifiability while
the latter can but requires infrastructure to equip voters with signing keys.
We will not delve deeper into how the various E2E V schemes work but rather
assume that the correct set of encrypted votes is posted to the Bulletin Board.
2.2 Ballot Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion Resistance
Ballot privacy is often defined using anonymity style definitions as originally
proposed in [23]. Informally, consider two instances of the system, one in which
A votes for X and B for Y , and the other in which the votes are swapped. If the
attacker is unable to distinguish these two instances then the system is deemed to
satisfy ballot privacy. More formal definitions can be found, for example, in [10].
Note that even in extreme cases, for example when all voters vote for X , such
a system will satisfy the above definition, even though in that case the attacker
knows precisely how each voter voted.
It was later realised that simple notions of ballot privacy in the presence of a
passive attacker are not enough. For E2E V schemes we have to worry about ways
that the voter might be able to prove her vote to a third party. This motivates
the requirement for receipt-freeness [4]: the voter cannot acquire evidence that
would enable her to construct a proof to a third party as to how she voted.
In the face of a yet more active attacker who might interact with the voter
before, during and after voting, potentially issuing detailed instructions and
requiring the voter to reveal credentials, ephemeral random values etc, we need
even stronger notions. This threat model motivates the property of coercion
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resistance for which many different definitions have been proposed [12], reflecting
various subtle distinctions. We will adopt the following definition, informally
stated:
A voting system S is coercion resistant if, for all c ∈ C there exists a
voter strategy ψ such that for all attacker strategies φ, the voter can
cast her intended vote c and the attacker cannot tell that she did not
obey his instructions.
Such a style of definition appears to be the most powerful in that it cap-
tures the privacy failure in the case of unanimous votes, forced abstention and
randomisation attacks.
2.3 Selene
We now give a sketch of how voter-verification is achieved in the Selene voting
protocol. Full details can be found in [20]. In Selene, the verification is much more
direct and intuitive than is the case for conventional E2E V systems: rather than
checking for the presence of her encrypted vote on the BB, the voter checks her
vote in cleartext in the tally on the BB identified by a secret, deniable tracker.
During the setup phase the set of distinct trackers are posted on the BB,
verifiably encrypted and mixed and then assigned to the voters according the
resulting secret permutation. This ensures that each voter is assigned a unique,
secret tracker.
For each encrypted tracker, a trapdoor commitment is created for which
the voter holds the secret trapdoor key. In essence this is the “β” term of an
El Gamal encryption of the tracker, where the “α” term is kept secret for the
moment.
Voting is as usual: an encryption of the vote is created, and sent to the
server for posting to the BB against the voter (pseudo)Id. Once we are happy
that we have the correct set of validly cast, encrypted votes, we can proceed to
tabulation: the (encrypted vote, tracker) pairs are put through verifiable, parallel
re-encryption mixes and decrypted, revealing the vote/tracker pairs in plaintext.
Later, the α terms are sent via an untappable channel to the voters to enable
them to open the commitment using their secret, trapdoor key. If coerced, the
voter can generate a fake α that will open her commitment to an alternative
tracker pointing to the coercer’s choice. With the trapdoor, creating such a fake
α is computationally straightforward. On the other hand, computing a fake α
that will open the commitment to a given, valid tracker is intractable without
the trapdoor. Thus, assuming that the voter’s trapdoor is not compromised, the
α term is implicitly authenticated by the fact that it opens to a valid tracker.
3 Risk-Limiting Audits
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) [16] of a reported election outcome is any proce-
dure that has a known minimum chance of correcting the reported outcome if
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the outcome is wrong (and that cannot render a correct outcome incorrect). In
this case, the outcome means the winner or winners, not the precise tally. The
reported outcome is correct if it is the outcome that an accurate manual tally
of the underlying voter-verified records would show.4 The maximal chance that
the procedure will fail to correct an outcome that is wrong is the risk limit.
RLAs generally pose auditing as a sequential test of the hypothesis that the
reported outcome is incorrect. The audit continues to examine more ballots until
either the hypothesis is rejected or the audit has conducted a full manual tally.
The use of sequential tests enables RLAs to stop as soon as there is convincing
evidence that the reported outcome is correct, reducing the number of ballots
the audit inspects.
RLAs check reported outcomes while RLTs determine what outcomes to
report. However, similar sequential testing methods can allow RLTs to stop the
tally (of a random permutation of the ballots) as soon as there is convincing
statistical evidence of the electoral outcome, which the RLT then reports. A
RLT declares “either this is the correct outcome, or an event occurred that had
probability no larger than α,” where α ∈ (0, 1) is any pre-specified risk limit.
Minimizing the number of ballots that must be tallied maximizes the number of
ballots kept shrouded, improving privacy and coercion-resistance.
There are two general strategies for RLAs: ballot-polling and comparison.
Ballot-polling manually examines randomly selected ballots for evidence of who
won. A comparison audit has three steps: first, the voting system must commit to
its interpretation of physically identifiable individual ballots or groups of ballots
comprising all ballots validly cast in the election. Second, auditors check that
the exported data reproduces the reported results. Third, auditors compare the
manual interpretation of a random sample of ballots or groups of ballots to
the voting system’s interpretation. Further, “hybrid” methods combine ballot-
polling for some groups of ballots and comparisons for other groups; see [18].
Comparison audits require auditors to know how the equipment interpreted
the ballots, so they are not suitable for RLTs, where we seek evidence about
who won just from a subset of the shrouded votes. Below, we show how a new
procedure for ballot-polling RLAs can be adapted for RLTs.
4 Risk-Limiting Tallies
We propose a simple modification of the way that votes are tallied to address the
issues outlined in the introduction. Rather than tallying all votes straight-off, the
election authority reveals the votes for a random sequence of encrypted ballots,
continuing until the sample gives the acceptable level of risk in the outcome
(i.e., who won). If the true margin of victory is not too small, the outcome can
be determined with high confidence (i.e., low risk) while leaving a substantial
number of ballots unopened, thus allowing a voter to claim that they cast the
4 The trustworthiness of the underlying records should be assessed by a compliance
audit [25]. A RLA that relies on an untrustworthy record cannot reliably assess
whether outcomes reflect how voters voted.
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ballot required by the coercer even if such a ballot was not revealed during
the partial tally. The approach is thus inspired by the idea of Risk-Limiting
Audits (RLAs), [24,16], but here we apply the approach to determining the
correct outcome rather than checking whether a reported outcome is correct.
That difference turns out to have surprising statistical implications; in particular,
larger sample sizes are generally required to control the risk to the same level.
RLAs test the null hypothesis that the reported winner(s) did not actually
win, rather than determine the correct outcome ab initio. Moreover, the operat-
ing characteristics of existing RLAs depend on the reported results. For instance,
comparison audits test whether the reported margin overstated the true margin
by enough to cause the reported winners to be incorrect. Previous methods for
ballot-polling audits, such as BRAVO [15] test the hypothesis that the reported
outcome is wrong against the alternative that the reported vote shares are nearly
correct.
For RLTs, we do not have reported results to leverage, so we need a new
approach. Section 4.1 presents a probability inequality; Section 4.2 applies it
to produce a new sequential ballot-polling test, the engine for the RLT scheme
presented in Section 5 based on the Selene E2E V protocol.
4.1 Tests for the Mean of a Non-Negative Population
Extant methods for RLAs generally involve the reported results in some way.
Here, we present a new sequential method to determine with high confidence
who won, without specifying a particular alternative hypothesis. The method
applies to plurality (including vote-for-k), majority, and super-majority social
choice functions, but we present the method in detail only for plurality contests.
Our RLT method is based on tests about the mean of a non-negative pop-
ulation. Consider a population of N items, each labeled with a non-negative
number.5 Let xi ≥ 0 be the label of item i, i = 1, . . . , N . Let µ ≡
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi
be the mean of the labels. Moreover, let t denote the hypothesized value of the
population mean µ.
We sample items at random, sequentially, without replacement, such that the
(conditional) probability that item k is selected in the jth draw is 1N−j+1 , given
that item k was not selected before the jth draw. Xj denotes the number on the
label of the item selected on the jth draw. Define Sj ≡
∑j
k=1Xk, S˜j ≡ Sj/N ,
and j˜ ≡ 1− (j − 1)/N . Let
Yn ≡
∫ 1
0
n∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ. (1)
It has been shown in [11] that if µ = t (i.e., if the null hypothesis is true), then
(Yj)
N
j=1 is a nonnegative closed martingale with expected value 1. Kolmogorov’s
5 In our case, the items will be ballots, and their labels will represent votes; see Sec-
tion 4.2.
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inequality then implies that for any J ∈ {1, . . . , N} and any p ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
(
max
1≤j≤J
Yj(t) > 1/p
)
≤ p.
This can be used as the basis of a ballot-polling RLA that does not require a
reference tally, as we show below. The same result holds for sequential sampling
with replacement, re-defining S˜j ≡ 0 and j˜ ≡ 1 (the limit of the finite-population
result as N → ∞). We also note that [11] provides a recursive algorithm for
computing the integral (1).
4.2 Risk-Limiting Tallies
Consider plurality contests that allow each voter to vote for k ≥ 1 of C candi-
dates. The winner(s) are the k candidates who receive the most votes. We ignore
the possibility of ties; they are an easy extension. Majority and super-majority
are straightforward generalizations; see [24].
Candidate w is one of the winners if w received more votes than at least
C − k other candidates. In general, some ballots will have invalid votes or votes
for other candidates. Consider a single pair of candidates, w and ℓ. Let Nw
denote the number of ballots in the population that show a vote for w but not
for ℓ; let Nℓ denote the number of ballots in the population that show a vote for
ℓ but not for w, and let Nu ≡ N −Nw −Nℓ denote the number of ballots that
show a vote for neither w nor ℓ or show votes for both w and ℓ.
Let Wj be the number of items labeled with w selected on or before draw
j; and define Lj analogously. The probability distributions of those variables
depend on Nw, Nℓ, and Nu, even though we only care about one parameter,
Nw−Nℓ. Now Nw ≤ Nℓ if and only ifNw+Nu/2 ≤ Nℓ+Nu/2. Since Nℓ+Nu/2 =
N − (Nw +Nu/2), we have Nw+Nu/2 ≤ N − (Nw +Nu/2). We can now divide
by N to obtain Nw+Nu/2N ≤ 1−
Nw+Nu/2
N from which we get
Nw +Nu/2
N
≤
1
2
. (2)
Let
µwℓ ≡
1×Nw +
1
2
×Nu + 0×Nℓ
N
.
This is the mean of a population derived from re-labeling each vote for w as 1,
each vote for ℓ as 0, and the rest as 1/2. The mean of this population is greater
than 1/2 iff w received more votes than ℓ. We can test the hypothesis µwℓ ≤ 1/2
(i.e., w did not beat ℓ) using the martingale-based test above by simply treating
the sampled ballots that way: every ballot with a vote for w (but not ℓ) counts as
1, every ballot with a vote for ℓ (but not for w) counts as 0, and invalid ballots,
ballots with votes for other candidates, and ballots with votes for both w and ℓ
count as 1/2.
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To determine the set of winners, we sequentially test the collection of C(C−1)
hypotheses
{Hwℓ : µwℓ ≤ 1/2, w = 1, . . . , C; ℓ = 1, . . . , C;w 6= ℓ}, (3)
stopping when either
– there is a set W of cardinality k such that we have rejected the hypothesis
µwℓ ≤ 1/2 for every (w, ℓ) with w ∈ W and ℓ /∈ W , or
– we have examined a too high percentage of votes from the privacy point of
view, in which case the sampling strategy is abandoned and different means
are used to determine with certainty who won, see Section 5.1 for details.
Proposition 1. If every hypothesis is tested at level α, the probability that this
algorithm misidentifies the set of winner(s) is at most k(C − k)α.
Proof. The approach misidentifies one or more winners iff it terminates in the
first branch, but W is not the set of winners: ∃w ∈ W , ℓ /∈ W s.t. µwℓ ≤ 1/2. In
a RLA, a wrong outcome can only be confirmed if every true null hypothesis is
erroneously rejected. In contrast, in a RLT, a wrong outcome can be confirmed
if just one particular true null hypothesis is rejected: the hypothesis that the
candidate with the k+1st highest vote share got fewer votes than the candidate
with the kth highest vote share.
There are C(C − 1) hypotheses {Hw,ℓ} in all, of which C(C − 1)/2 are true.
Of the true null hypotheses, those whose erroneous rejection would make the
reported outcome wrong are the k(C − k) that compare the vote share of a can-
didate inW to the vote share of a candidate inWc: if none of those is erroneously
rejected, the set of winners is correct. Observe that if we used the logical impli-
cations of the statistical rejections to entail rejections of other hypotheses—for
instance, Hwℓ ∩ Hℓk → Hwk—this would not be true. Therefore, a Bonferroni
multiplicity adjustment of k(C − k) certainly suffices. Note that this may be
conservative as an estimate, because there are logical dependencies among the
hypotheses. ⊓⊔
The aim of the sampling is to test the hypothesis “µwℓ ≤ 1/2.” Rejecting µwℓ ≤
1/2 means proving with risk at most α that w won the pairwise contest with ℓ.
Proposition 2. If we reject µwℓ ≤ 1/2 at significance level α and reject µℓm ≤
1/2 at significance level α, then we reject µwm ≤ 1/2 at significance level α.
Proof (sketch). This transitivity property follows from the monotonicity of the
P -values in the number of votes for each candidate, at each sample size j. ⊓⊔
4.3 Sample sizes
Because the underlying statistical test is sequential, the audit can start by look-
ing at a single ballot selected at random, calculate the p-values for all not-yet-
rejected null hypotheses, and continue to increase the sample one ballot at a
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time until the risk limit has been met. However, depending on the desired risk
limit, the RLT will not be able to terminate until some minimum number of
ballots has been tallied.
The minimum sample sizes required to identify the winner with a maximum
error rate of α are given in Table 1, for sampling without replacement, for a
plurality contest with 2 candidates and a plurality contest with 10 candidates.
The sample sizes listed are exactly those that would be required if the votes were
unanimously for one candidate; if more than one candidate receives votes, the
sample size becomes random and becomes stochastically larger.
Similarly, if a fraction u of ballots do not have a valid vote for any candidate,
the sample size will also be random, and the expected sample size will grow by a
factor of 1/(1−u). For instance, if 10% of ballots have no vote and 90% of ballots
have a vote for candidate A in a 10-candidate plurality election, the expected
sample size to identify the winner with risk limit 0.1% is 17/0.9 = 18.9 ballots.
The closer the vote is to unanimous, the fewer ballots need to be revealed
(the distribution is stochastically smaller the more nearly unanimous the vote).
I.e., the protection a RLT offers is greatest when the risk is greatest.
For a two-candidate plurality election, only one of the two null hypotheses
µℓm ≤ 1/2 can be true; thus, no multiplicity adjustment is needed. (This is
consistent with the formula k(C − k) = 1 × (2 − 1) = 1.) For a 10-candidate
plurality election, the Bonferroni adjustment factor is 1 × (10 − 1) = 9. As the
table shows, if the vote is (nearly) unanimous, the number of ballots required to
identify the winner with negligible error probability is small: 35 suffices to have
an error probability less than 10−9 for a two-candidate contest, and 38 suffices
for a 10-candidate contest. Because the risk drops by an order of magnitude with
an increase in sample size of about 4 ballots when the vote is (nearly) unanimous,
the penalty for multiplicity is low in absolute terms. If the RLT sample is drawn
without replacement, the expected sample sizes required to attain a given risk
are smaller—but not by much unless the total number of ballots is small.
candidates α
10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−6 10−7 10−8 10−9
2 5 9 13 17 21 24 28 31 35
10 9 13 17 20 24 27 31 34 38
Table 1. Minimum sample sizes to identify the winner of a two-candidate plurality
contest and a 10-candidate plurality contest at risk limit α, for sampling with replace-
ment. Actual sample sizes approach these minima (with high probability) as voter
preferences approach unanimity.
5 Incorporating RLT in E2E V Voting Protocols
RLTs can be used in a straightforward way with any E2E V scheme in which
the set of encrypted votes appears on a Bulletin Board (BB) and is applicable
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to either remote or in-person voting. The encryption should be homomorphic
and probabilistic: for instance, ElGamal can be used. Helios [1], Preˆt a` Voter [8],
Selene [20], etc., would all be amenable.
Conceptually, we can start with a random permutations of the encrypted
votes and take samples from left to right, opening more ballots as required. The
verifiable shuffles used in many schemes naturally give us a random permutation.
However, we must be careful about simply taking the permutation output of the
underlying scheme’s shuffles, as there may be opportunities to manipulate this
and bias the sampling. The sampling must be truly random and demonstrably
outwith the control of any entity. This brings us to the challenge of certifiable
randomness, which arises in many contexts: lotteries, voting, auctions, public
ledgers etc. A number of approaches have been proposed, for example using a
seed derived from a hash of prices of previously agreed stock market options at
an agreed future time. Alternative approaches involve combining random values
previously committed by a number of independent entities. Algorand [17] adopts
such an approach combined with the use of verifiable random functions. Another
possibility is to derive the seed from a cryptographic hash of suitable data posted
to the BB. RLAs have employed seeds generated in a public ceremony of dice
rolling. We might rely on a trusted third party such as the NIST random beacon
service. For the purposes of this paper do not specify a particular approach but
leave it for the stakeholders to select.
Sampling with replacement can be implemented straightforwardly by per-
forming further mixes between samplings.
5.1 Guaranteeing Plausible Deniability
For most elections, the RLT approach will naturally leave a good proportion of
unrevealed votes. However, there will be cases where the winning margins are
narrow, and thus the RLT might result in all or almost all votes being revealed.
It is not enough for a system to be (objectively) coercion resistant, it must also
be seen as coercion resistant. Thus, for the RLT approach to be effective, we
must ensure that the voters will never be, nor expect to be, in a situation in
which plausible deniability fails. In this section we identify such situations, and
describe some strategies to deal with the potential vulnerability.
Of course, a close run referendum will not be a problem, but a problematic
scenario is a close margin between candidatesX and Y , along with a low-support
candidate Z. This could result in a full count where the low score Z opens up the
possibility of coercion. We have already indicated that coercion for Z is possibly
harmful for the outcome of the election, as it can be used to decrease the number
of votes that either X or Y gets. Note also, again, that this kind of coercion is
feasible not only when the voter knows (e.g., from polls) the a close run will
occur. In many cases, it suffices that the voter thinks it might happen to get
her worried and vulnerable to threats. We propose that, in such circumstances,
the system should switch to a fallback strategy that works in all cases. Example
fallback strategies are sketched below.
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PET testing. In the event of a close race between X and Y , start Plaintext
Equivalence Testing of randomly selected, unrevealed ballots against {X}PK
and {Y }PK , until we reach the required confidence for the winner.
Tally hiding. One can also fall back to computationally heavy methods e.g.
MPC for only disclosing the winner, see e.g. [9,26,6,27]. Note that the revealed
votes and reduced number of possible winners will make these methods more
efficient than if used from the onset.
A possibility is to have the tellers perform a secret computation of the tally,
and announce the winner(s), but not the numerical tally, on which to base a
null hypothesis. This allows the RLT to be computed much more efficiently, and
the secretly computed tallies can guide the appropriate strategy to adopt in the
event of narrow margins.
6 Security Assumptions
In this section we briefly state the security guarantees and give some arguments
for their validity. For the exposition below, we introduce the following three au-
thorities besides the voters: The Tally Tellers TT holding the secret election key
in a threshold manner, the Mixnet TellersMT mixing the encrypted votes before
doing the risk-limiting tally, and a random sampling authority RSA organising
the random sampling of votes for the tally.
For simplicity let us also assume that the underlying voting scheme that
we build on is mixnet-based, i.e., the main difference between the RLT version
and the original version is that not all ciphertexts output from the mixnet are
decrypted, but only a proportion of them.
In general, if RSA is acting honestly, or bound to do so e.g. via a verifiable
proof based on a computational assumption, then the security reduces to that of
the underlying scheme. For privacy, we normally have to trust that a threshold
set of TT is not colluding and at least one server inMT is honest. For verifiability
most schemes will not impose verifiable trust in TT or MT but might rely on
computational assumptions and the RO-model or a CRS setup.
Verifiability. When random sampling procedure is corrupted, the adversary
could possibly adjust the outcome in his favour. However, note that in this situa-
tion we can still achieve verifiability by having RSA committing to the sampling
order before mixing, and assuming the last mix node is honest (or assuming one
arbitrary mix node is honest and no threshold set of TT is corrupted). This will
ensure that the final sampling is random.
Ballot-Privacy. Obviously, a necessary assumption for ballot-privacy is that a
threshold set of TT are not colluding, and at least one mix node is honest. If the
random sampling is also honest, we get strictly less information from the tally
than in the original scheme, and we thus achieve better privacy in an information
theoretic sense. When using standard ballot-privacy definitions on the scheme
it should also be possible to reduce the ballot-privacy to that of the underlying
scheme, the only subtlety being that tally functions differ in the two schemes.
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It might seem that a corruption of the random sampling procedure should not
influence ballot-privacy. However, there is one assumption to make: the random
sampling should, in the computational view of the adversary, be uncorrelated
with the cast votes. Having input from the voters to the random sampling could
indeed make sense from a verifiability viewpoint, like in Demos [13], but should
not depend on the vote choice unless this is computationally hidden.
Coercion-Resistance and Vote-Buying Resistance. As we have discussed
above, the RLT protocol in general improves the coercion-resistance especially
when candidates are expected to have a low vote count. It would be interesting
to relate this to the coercion-resistance level δ in Kusters et al. [14]. On the other
hand, the security against vote-buying is not increased in the same way since
the voter here has an intent to obtain a receipt. The vote buyer could indeed
follow the Italian attack method and the marked ballot would often appear.
The above is reminiscent of a distinguishing example between vote-buying
and coercion resistance due to Rivest:6 the system chooses at random whether
or not to provide the voter with a plaintext receipt. Such a system is, arguably,
coercion resistant (the voter can claim to have received no receipt) but is vulner-
able to vote buying (the voter might comply in the hope of getting the pay-off).
7 Risk-Limiting Verification
The idea of using risk-limiting techniques to improve coercion resistance can also
be applied to verification of votes. Here, we apply the idea to Selene, allowing us
to ensure that a proportion of the trackers remain unrevealed. In consequence,
the coerced voter can always claim that her tracker was amongst those that re-
mained shrouded. Some subtleties have to be handled in the case of an obnoxious
coercer who demands the voter divulge their tracker; we describe those below.
Indeed, these consideration require some modifications of the way Selene works.
7.1 Risk-Limiting Verification in Selene
A drawback of Selene, as noted in the original paper, is that when a coerced voter
claims a fake tracker, the coercer (who is also a voter) could maintain that this
is in fact his tracker. By construction, the coercer cannot prove this to the voter,
but the voter is now in a difficult position: she knows that the claim might be
true. Elaborations of the basic scheme are proposed, but they complicate things
and render the verification less transparent: the final tally contains dummy votes
that must be subtracted out to get the true result.
The RLT idea can be extended to avoiding revealing all the trackers in a run
of a Selene election. The natural step is to apply the RLT mechanisms described
above to reveal as many votes as necessary and then reveal the corresponding
trackers. There would seem to be little point in revealing trackers for which the
corresponding vote has not been revealed. There may, however, be some merit
6 private communication
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in revealing a subset of the trackers for which the votes have been revealed, as
we discuss below.
Risk Limiting Verification (RLV), as applied to Selene, can ensure that not
all trackers are revealed, thus allowing a coerced voter to simply claim that their
tracker did not appear. There is still a problem, however, if we use Selene in its
original form: the full set of trackers is published, so the coercer could require
the voter to reveal her tracker anyway, and still claim that it is his.
We can fix this fairly easily: one purpose of revealing all the trackers in the
setup phase is to demonstrate that they are all distinct, so the EA could publish
a list of encrypted trackers for which the trustees run pairwise PETs to show
that all the plaintexts differ. This would be computationally heavy and does not
scale well, but is no worse than, e.g., JCJ [12]. Moreover, we can use some of
the approaches to linearising the JCJ-style checks, for example by raising the
tracker ciphertexts to the same, secret exponent and then verifiably decrypting.
We note that we get a form of partial random checking anyway when we
reveal a random sample of the trackers: if all the revealed trackers in say a 90%
random sample are distinct then we have very high confidence that they all
are distinct. The drawback of this approach is that if the EA has cheated and
included collisions then we will not discover this until rather late. Note, however,
that we could reveal the trackers first, before revealing the votes. Now, if we find
collisions, we can abort the election before any tally results have been revealed.
Still, one problem remains: another reason to publish the set of trackers is to
allow voters to confirm that the α term sent to them is authentic: it opens the
commitment to a valid tracker, i.e., a member the published set. If we do not
publish the set of trackers then we need another mechanism for voters to confirm
that their notified tracker is “valid.” We can achieve this by requiring that valid
trackers are drawn from a negligible subset of the full space, e.g., numbers with
say six digits. Now it is still intractable to produce fake α terms that will open
a given commitment to a member of this set, but, by adjusting the number of
digits we can ensure that the chance that a fake tracker will collide with the
coercer’s is greatly reduced, so improving the plausible deniability.
If this reduced probability of tracker collision is deemed unacceptable, then
we could allow the voter to request a fake tracker from the Notification Authority.
This authority knows which valid trackers have not been assigned and so can
provide an unassigned tracker to the coerced voter. This requires a level of trust
in this entity, to keep tracker-related information secret but such trust is needed
anyway.
There remains the question of whether all the voters should be notified of
their tracker, even when their tracker has not been revealed on the BB. The
immediate thought is not to notify unrevealed trackers, but this introduces pos-
sibilities of the authorities exploiting this: leading many voters to think that
their tracker was not revealed and so denying them the possibility to verify their
vote. It is not clear how we could verify that all the voters whose trackers are
revealed are notified, so it seems wiser to notify each voter of their tracker.
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8 Related Work
A number of papers [9,26,6,27] try to achieve tally hiding, either by only cal-
culating the winner(s), or via multi-party computation and other cryptographic
means. An idea closer to RLTs is that of Random Sample Voting (RSV) by
Chaum [7]. A scheme that seeks to implement RSV in a fully verifiable fashion
is Alethea [3]. RSV typically samples a small and predetermined number of vot-
ers, regardless of the margins. In contrast, RLTs adjust the sample size to obtain
the desired level of confidence in the reported outcome.
The idea of Risk-Limiting Verification is somewhat analogous to Rivest’s
ThreeBallot protocol [19]. Recall that, in ThreeBallot, each voter can verify a
random 1/3 of her cast ballot. Thus, RLV gives “vote handles” to a fraction of
voters, whereas in ThreeBallot each voter gets a handle to a fraction of her vote.
9 Conclusions
This paper presents two simple methods, RLT and RLV, for reducing the amount
of information provided in the tally and verification stages. In consequence, we
enhance the coercion-resistance by giving coerced voters plausible deniability,
while achieving whatever confidence level in the outcome is required. An impor-
tant future step will be to understand how well this method protects coerced
voters in practice. It would be good also to understand better the trade-off be-
tween confidence in the outcome and plausible deniability levels.
There exist other methods that leak less information in the tally process, e.g.,
by using multi-party computation to only reveal the winner of the election. Such
methods might be better suited to avoid strategic voting in runoff elections, and
may provide somewhat better deniability. However, those methods require more
elaborate and computationally expensive cryptography; arguably, our methods
are more efficient and transparent.
The novel Risk-Limiting techniques introduced here should be of independent
interest and have applications beyond the RLTs and RLVs described here.
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